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ARTICLES
Responding to Public Health Emergencies on Tribal Lands:
Jurisdictional Challenges and Practical Solutions
Justin B. Barnard
Abstract:
Response to public health emergencies on tribal lands poses a unique
challenge for state and tribal public health officials. The complexity and intensely
situation-specific nature of federal Indian jurisprudence leaves considerable
question as to which government entity, state or tribal, has jurisdiction on tribal
lands to undertake basic emergency measures such as closure of public spaces,
quarantine, compulsory medical examination, and investigation. That
jurisdictional uncertainty, coupled with cultural differences and an often troubled
history of tribal-state relations, threatens to significantly impede response to
infectious disease outbreaks or other public health emergencies on tribal lands.
Given that tribal communities may be disproportionately impacted by public
health emergencies, it is critical that tribal, state, and local governments engage
with each other in coordinated planning for public health threats.
This Article is offered as a catalyst for such planning efforts. The Article
identifies some of the most pressing jurisdictional issues that may confront
governments responding to a public health emergency on tribal lands, with the
aim of highlighting the nature of the problem and the need for action. The Article
goes on to examine the most promising means of addressing jurisdictional
uncertainty: intergovernmental agreements. Already utilized in many areas of
This Article was the product of a public health fellowship generously sponsored by the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the National Association of Attorneys General; the author
wishes to thank both organizations. The Article also would not have been possible without the
support of the Office of the Maine Attorney General, and particularly that of Assistant Attorney
General Doris Hamett.
This Article is the work of the author only, and does not represent the views of the Office of
the Maine Attorney General. The legal status of the federally recognized Indian tribes in Maine is
largely shaped by the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-35 (2012), and the
Maine Implementing Act, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 30, §§ 6201-14 (2014). In light of those enactments,
it is the position of the Office of the Maine Attorney General that the legal principles discussed in
this Article do not apply to Maine's tribes.
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shared interest between tribe and state, intergovernmental agreements offer
neighboring state, local, and tribal governments a vehicle for delineating roles
and authorities in an emergency, and may lay the groundwork for sharing
resources. The Article surveys various representative tribal public health
intergovernmental agreements, and concludes with suggestions for tribes and
state or local governments looking to craft their own agreements.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of trans-border coordination poses one of the more vexing and
persistent problems in the field of public health. Threats to the public health are
rarely confined to one political jurisdiction. Rather, in an extensively
interconnected modem world, public health threats tend to follow the rapid flow
of people and goods between localities.1 Proper planning and agreements for
reporting information, coordinating investigation and countermeasures, and
sharing resources across borders are vital for an effective response to public
health emergencies.
Meeting this imperative for trans-border coordination is difficult enough
between two sovereigns with clear jurisdictional boundaries and lines of
authority. The borders that delineate American Indian lands within the United
States, however, present a special and challenging case. A shifting and complex
body of law controls jurisdiction on Indian lands. This leaves many open
questions regarding the scope of tribal and state authority to regulate and respond
to threats to public health. Jurisdictional uncertainty is compounded in some
states by a rocky history of state-tribal relations,' as well as by simple geography:
tribal lands may be fragmented and "checkerboarded" with non-Indian lands
within a state,3 or they may straddle the border between two or more states.4
Challenges notwithstanding, observers have identified a strong need for
states and tribes to coordinate responses to public health emergencies on Indian
lands.5 There are 566 federally recognized Indian tribes and Alaska Native
1. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Global Health Law Governance, 22 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 35, 35
(2008) ("The determinants of health do not originate solely with the national borders, pathogens,
air, food, water, and even lifestyle choices. Health threats, rather, spread inexorably to neighboring
countries, regions, and even continents").
2. See Rick Hogan et al., Assessing Cross-Sectoral nd Cross-Jurisdictional Coordination for
Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 36, 39 (2008).
3. A marked example of such "checkerboarding" can be found in Oklahoma, where police
reportedly have to carry GPS units to track jurisdictional boundaries. See Angela R. Riley, Indians
and Guns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1731 (2012).
4. The Navajo Nation, for example, extends across parts of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.
See Paul Spruhan, Standard Clauses in State-Tribal Agreements: The Navajo Nation Experience,
47 TULSA L. REV. 503, 504 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Amy Groom et al., Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Vulnerable Populations
in Tribal Communities, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S271, S271 (2009) ("Tribal and state leadership
should . . . cooperate closely to clarify responsibilities that may cross jurisdictional lines, legal
authorities should be defined for specific public health activities needed to assist vulnerable
populations in tribal communities, and legal tools, such as mutual aid agreements, should be used to
help accomplish these tasks"); Cheryl H. Bullard et al., Improving Cross-Sectoral and Cross-
Jurisdictional Coordination for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS
57, 59 (2008) (identifying gap and suggesting steps to improve tribal coordination with local, state
15:2 (2015)
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villages distributed across a majority (thirty-five) of the fifty states.6 These tribes,
with populations ranging from hundreds to hundreds of thousands,7 live on land
bases that may be a few acres or tens of thousands of acres.8 The public health
infrastructures among tribes vary greatly; some have their own health
departments and health codes while others have no public health infrastructure at
all.9 Public health emergencies may also pose a greater threat to tribes than to the
general American population due to a variety of factors, including prevalence of
chronic disease, poverty, and difficulties accessing medical care. ' 0 In both the
1918-1919 influenza pandemic and the 2009 HINI influenza event, the mortality
rate among Indians in the United States was roughly four times that of other
groups." Recent amendments to the federal Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act' 2 allow tribes to directly petition for a federal
emergency declaration and receive federal assistance in the same manner as state
governments. These changes have improved tribal emergency response
capacity, 1 3 as have federal, state, and tribal initiatives to encourage tribal public
health emergency planning. However, these enhancements to tribal preparedness
do not eliminate the need for coordination with tribal neighbors.
This Article examines the vital issue of response to public health
emergencies on tribal lands from the state perspective. It explores both the legal
challenges of responding to public health emergencies that cross tribal borders as
well as the practical means of addressing those challenges through cooperation
with tribes. Part I provides a brief overview of the types of emergency measures
that might be used to address public health emergencies on tribal lands. Part II
surveys the legal landscape for state public health officials contemplating a
response to a public health emergency on tribal lands, cataloging some of the
jurisdictional issues that might arise in the course of an emergency. Part III
and federal governments on public health emergency preparedness).
6. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 77 Fed. Reg. 47868 (Aug. 10, 2012).
7. See Groom et al., supra note 5, at S27 1.
8. See Ralph T. Bryan et al., Public Health Legal Preparedness in Indian Country, 99 Am. J.
PUB. HEALTH 607, 608 (2009).
9. Id. at 609.
10. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Deaths Related to 2009 Pandemic Influenza A
(HINI) Among American Indian/Alaska Natives-12 States, 2009, 58 MORTALITY & MORBIDITY
WKLY. REP. 1341, 1341 (Dec. 11, 2009).
11. Id.; Groom et al., supra note 5, at S271.
12. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
288, 88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 and various sections of titles 12,
16, 20, 26, and 38 of the United States Code).
13. Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of Jan. 29, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-2, § 1110, 127 Stat.
4, 47-49 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5122, 5123, 5170, 5191 (2012)).
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discusses the negotiation of intergovernmental agreements, one practical avenue
for resolving legal impediments to emergency response. Part 1V describes current
intergovernmental agreements in the arena of tribal public health emergency
response and planning. The conclusion suggests specific issues that should be
addressed in an agreement between tribe and state to clarify roles,
responsibilities, and authorities in a public health emergency.
I. LEGAL MEASURES AVAILABLE FOR RESPONSE TO A PUBLIC HEALTH
EMERGENCY ON TRIBAL LANDS
To appreciate the challenges of responding to a public health emergency
across tribal borders, one must be familiar with the legal tools at a state's
disposal for addressing public health threats. The full measure of legal
mechanisms and authorities that can be used in response to a public health
emergency arises from a "tangled architecture" of federal, state, and local laws. 14
The brief discussion below introduces some of the more commonly invoked
authorities under state law to respond to a public health emergency.
The exercise of public health authority has historically been the province of
the states, as it is one of the police powers explicitly reserved to them by the
Tenth Amendment. 15 Pursuant to that reserved authority, each state in the Union
has enacted laws to control infectious disease and respond to public health
emergencies. These laws created a diverse array of state-specific authorities and
procedures.16 In many cases, states also delegated response authorities to local
units of government.'7 The scope of this state and local authority to respond to
14. Lance Gable, Evading Emergency: Strengthening Emergency Responses Through
Integrated Pluralistic Governance, 91 OR. L. REV. 375, 396 (2012).
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (listing among the police powers
reserved to the States "[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health laws of every description").
16. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: A Study of Infectious Disease
Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59, 63 (1999). In the last decade or so, there has been
a significant effort to modernize state public health laws to address current challenges. Following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the anthrax attacks later that year, the Centers for
Disease Control asked Lawrence Gostin, professor and attorney with the Center for Law and the
Public's Health, to draft model legislation to strengthen state public health emergency response
capacity. See Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379, 383 (2003). That undertaking eventually produced the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA). Id. Legislation based on the MSEHPA has been
introduced in a majority of states, and a good number of those measures have been passed into law.
Id. at 384-85.
17. The Supreme Court has expressly upheld the delegation of state police powers to local
government entities. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) ("[T]he state may
15:2 (2015)
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public health threats has been held to be quite broad and, where necessary, to
justify significant restrictions on individual liberties.'8 Depending on the state,
the availability of specific public health authorities may depend upon a state or
local declaration of emergency.'9
Social distancing measures, even if rarely implemented, are among the most
familiar and foundational tools at a state's disposal for responding to a public
health threat.20 Quarantine laws typically allow a state to separate from the
general population and confine people who have been (or may have been)
exposed to a contagious disease. Isolation laws, similar in effect, allow the
separation and confinement of individuals who have been (or are reasonably
believed to have been) actually infected.2' State laws generally provide for
enforcement of quarantine and isolation by means of a civil fine, criminal
penalty, or both.22 Many states explicitly authorize or call for police assistance in
enforcement.2 3 Some states may require a court order to initiate quarantine or
24isolation, absent exigent circumstances, while others may require recourse to
the courts for enforcement of a quarantine or isolation order. 25
Social distancing may also include measures with broader, less targeted
effect. Quarantine orders may, for example, be issued for entire towns, cities, or
counties.26 State or local health officials may also have authority to issue orders
invest local bodies called into existence for purposes of local administration with authority in some
appropriate way to safeguard the public health and the public safety. The mode or manner in which
those results are to be accomplished is within the discretion of the state").
18. See, e.g., id. at 26 (upholding compulsory vaccination law and noting that "the liberty
secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not
import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint").
19. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-IOA-I (2014) (setting forth authorities and procedures
for declared public health emergency).
20. Edward P. Richards, Dangerous People, Unsafe Conditions, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 27, 34
(2009) (noting that isolation and quarantine are "relatively rare in modem public health practice").
21. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-1-204 (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-1OA-8 (2014); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 23-8-4 (2014); see also Reich, supra note 16, at 406-09 (explaining distinction
between quarantine and isolation).
22. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.320 (2015) (violation of quarantine or isolation a
misdemeanor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-1-204 (2015) (violation of quarantine punishable by fine of
between $10 and $100); N.H. REV. STAT. § 141-C:21 (2015) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-
530(C) (2015) (violation of quarantine a felony).
23. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-129b(a)(2) (2014); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-5 (2015);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-100 (2015).
24. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-789(B) (2015); HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-8(e), (f)
(2015).
25. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. § 141-C:13 (2015).
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-126 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:7 (2014).
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prohibiting public gatherings,27 closing schools,28 or closing and prohibiting
entrance to other buildings accessible to the public.2 9
Other emergency powers focus more directly on identifying and treating
infected individuals. Most jurisdictions have laws that permit public health
officials to conduct and compel individuals to submit to medical examinations,30
treatment for contagious disease,3' and vaccinations.32 While such provisions are
often subject to exemptions for religious and other reasons, they typically require
quarantine or isolation of those who refuse to comply.33 Other treatment-related
emergency authorities may include the power to secure healthcare facilities for
public use,34 ration medical supplies, 5 and access medical records.36
A public health emergency may also justify action to secure personal or real
property. Livestock and domestic animals are of particular concern, and many
jurisdictions explicitly authorize the inspection, quarantine, seizure, or
destruction of animals that may transmit diseases to humans.37 Other provisions
more generally authorize the seizure and destruction of property that poses a risk
to public health.38
State and local public health officials also have broad investigative powers
with respect to public health threats. Mississippi grants sweeping authority to its
health department "to investigate and control the causes of epidemic, infectious
and other disease affecting the public health, . . . and in pursuance thereof, to
exercise such physical control over property and individuals as the department
27. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-119 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2453(1) (2015);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 141-C:16-b (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.26 (2015).
28. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-5 (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.26 (2015).
29. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 128-8(2) (2015); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, § 2305/2(b) (2015);
N.H. REV. STAT. § 141-C:16-a (2015).
30. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-787(B)(1) (2015); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, §
2305/2(d) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-129b(a)(I)(A) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 441A.160(2)(b)
(2014).
31. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-787(C)(1) (2015); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, §
2305/2(e) (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-129b(a)(1)(A) (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 141-C:1 1(III),
141-C:15(l) (2015).
32. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 325-32 (2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-37 (2015).
33. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-129b(a)(1)(C) (2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-IOA-12(B),
12-1OA-13(B) (2014).
34. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-1OA-6(A)(1) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-310 (2015).
35. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-IOA-6(A)(2), (B) (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4-330(B)
(2015).
36. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, § 2305/2(h) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-1-80(B)(3)
(2015).
37. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 20, § 2305/2(g) (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-145 (2015).
38. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 128-8(2) (2015); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.12 (2015).
15:2 (2015)
8
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 15 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol15/iss2/1
RESPONDING TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES ON TRIBAL LANDS
may find necessary for the protection of the public health.39 Investigative
authorities often expressly include the power to enter and inspect private
propertyn° and may include other administrative investigation powers such as the
ability to subpoena individuals and documents.4 '
What can be gleaned from the discussion above is that public health
emergency authorities typically permit significant governmental intrusion into
and curtailment of personal and community rights to property, bodily integrity,
association with others, and freedom of movement.42 The coercive nature of
these measures, coupled with the jurisdictional uncertainty discussed in Part III,
underscores the need for tribal and state governments to work together. It is
important to ensure that the government entity implementing a particular
response to a public health threat does so with a mantle of legitimacy and the
support of its neighboring sovereign.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR RESPONSE TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES IN
INDIAN COUNTRY
Federal Indian law has a well-deserved reputation for its complexity. As one
leading scholar has characterized it, the body of Indian law "is rooted in
conflicting principles that leave the field in a morass of doctrinal and normative
incoherence.4 3 This doctrinal incoherence is not the only element that makes
Indian law challenging; its pattern of development also plays a fundamental role.
Decisions in individual federal court cases involving tribes often rest on a
variegated foundation of federal law, treaties, historical circumstance, and
consideration of the conflicting federal, state, and tribal interests in the case at
hand. As a consequence, few broad principles can reliably be applied from one
39. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-23-5 (2015); see also N.H. REV. STAT. § 141-C:9 (2015)
(authorizing investigation of communicable diseases, including "interviews with reporting officials,
their patients, and other persons affected by or having information pertaining to the communicable
disease, surveys of such individuals, inspections of buildings and conveyances and their contents,
and laboratory analysis of samples collected during the course of such inspections"); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-1-80(A) (2015) (requiring state health board to "investigate the reported causes of
communicable or epidemic disease and must enforce or prescribe these preventive measures as may
be needed to suppress or prevent the spread of these diseases by proper quarantine or other
measures of prevention").
40. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 144.0535 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-35-12(2) (2013); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 441A. 160(2)(a) (2014).
41. See, e.g., MINN. Stat. § 144.054 (2015).
42. The foregoing is neither a comprehensive list of authorities nor representative of every
jurisdiction.
43. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1754 (1997).
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decided case to the next.4
State governments planning for a response to a public health emergency that
crosses tribal borders thus confront an uncertain legal landscape. They do so with
precious little guidance: no published federal court decisions address state and
tribal authorities responding to a natural disaster or public health emergency.
Rather, state public health officials must take what cues they can from existing
precedents that address the division of state and tribal authority generally.45
This Part attempts to identify some of the legal complications that might
arise from a public health emergency response that crosses tribal borders and
describes the relevant principles of Indian law. The variability of Indian law
between different tribes and circumstances permits few firm predictions as to
how the law might be applied in a specific situation.46 This discussion is intended
as a starting point for the consideration of the types of legal barriers a state might
encounter-absent a formal cooperative agreement-in trying to coordinate an
emergency response involving tribal populations and land.
A. Threshold Issues: Sources of Law and Geographic Area of Application
Before turning to particular legal issues that may arise during a public health
emergency response involving a tribe, it is worth briefly canvassing two
44. As David Getches described it, not only are the few clearly announced "rules" in Indian
law periodically replaced with new rules or exceptions, "[e]ven the 'rules' tend to require case-by-
case analysis of each situation, and this requires a look at highly variable demographic facts
produced by a mix of past policies and historical accidents." David H. Getches, Negotiated
Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding
First Nations'Self-Government, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 120, 143 (1993).
45. While this discussion is largely framed from the state perspective, many states have
delegated public health emergency response authorities to local units of government. Courts tend to
apply the same analysis and standards to local governments in their dealings with tribes as they do
to the states; the most that can be said as a general matter is that the authority of a local government
to take action on tribal land will be no greater than that of a state, and may in some circumstances
be more circumscribed. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202,
212 n.I 1 (1987) (noting doubt as to whether Congress, in measure transferring jurisdiction over
tribal land to state, had authorized the application of local laws to reservations); Segundo v. City of
Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (tribal lands subject only to state laws, not
local regulation).
46. Taking this caution a step further, some commentators have suggested that the variability
in tribal history and circumstance defeats-or at least should defeat-any effort to develop a
coherent, uniformly applicable body of "Indian law." See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal
Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069 (2004); see also Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the Academic:
The Dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 141 (2005)
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threshold matters: the basic sources of "Indian law" 47 and the geographic area to
which it pertains.
Federal Indian law derives from the Indian Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, which grants Congress the authority to "regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations and among the several states and with the Indian tribes.,48 This
grant of authority to Congress to regulate Indian relations, coupled with the
Supremacy Clause,49 means that federal law controls issues of sovereignty and
jurisdiction.50 Federal control, however, does not necessarily mean uniformity. In
some areas, Congress has enacted broad laws that affect the status of all Indian
tribes within the United States; however, it has also exercised Indian Commerce
Clause authority to enact laws that affect only tribes in particular states51 or that
authorize states and tribes to redefine their legal relationship.52 This uneven body
of statutory law stands alongside other types of federal law that may supply the
controlling authority for a given tribe or issue of Indian law. This includes
treaties (ratified by Congress under its Indian Commerce Clause authority),
53
regulations promulgated by a number of executive branch agencies,54 and
executive orders.
55
Often, there is no specific federal law or treaty provision controlling the
issues that arise from state-tribal relations, and federal courts have been left to fill
the gaps. The United States Supreme Court in particular has played a central role
47. "Indian law" here refers to the law governing the relation of tribes to other governments,
not the laws enacted by tribes to govern their own lands and peoples.
48. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. See Winton v. Amos, 255 U.S. 373, 391 (1921) ("It is thoroughly established that
Congress has plenary authority over the Indians and all their tribal relations, and full power to
legislate concerning their tribal property."); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52
(1974) ("The plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians is drawn both
explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself.").
51. For example, in 1953, Congress enacted a measure transferring civil and criminal
adjudicatory jurisdiction over tribal lands to five states (California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Wisconsin). See Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012),
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)).
52. See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §401, 82 Stat. 73, 78 (1968)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012)) (authorizing states to assume criminal jurisdiction over
Indian country with the consent of the tribe).
53. See, e.g., Cree v. Flores, 157 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that terms of 1855 Treaty
with the Yakamas exempted tribal members from various state fees related to licensing and
operating trucks on state highways).
54. See 25 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1960).
55. Executive orders played a particularly pivotal role in the establishment of reservations in
the latter half of the nineteenth century and continuing until 1919, when Congress discontinued the
practice. See COIHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.03(9) (Nell Jessup Newton ed.,
2012).
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in defining the nature and extent of tribal sovereignty. One of the seminal early
cases in this area involved Georgia's conviction of a minister who took up
residence in the Cherokee nation without first procuring state license or taking an
oath to defend the state's laws and constitution. In this case, Chief Justice
Marshall described the Indian nations "as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors
of the soil, from time immemorial. 56 In light of this independence and the
federal government's exclusive right to regulate relations with the tribes,
Marshall held the Cherokee Nation to be "a distinct community occupying its
own territory ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.' 57 The
Court's current view on tribal sovereignty and its relationship to state jurisdiction
is starkly different from the vision articulated by Justice Marshall.18 Though the
federal courts are the major engines driving the development of Indian law, the
courts' resolution any particular issue of law is provisional; Congress has plenary
authority over tribal relations and may at any time override the courts. 59
The second threshold issue is how Congress and federal courts define the
geographic area where tribes may exercise their sovereignty. The importance of
this determination to the state public health official is plain: it identifies areas
where a state may have limited authority to unilaterally carry out emergency
response measures. Though the extent and exclusivity of tribal jurisdiction over a
particular piece of land may depend on who it is owned by (in the case of fee
land) or how it is used, at the most basic level it is the concept of "Indian
country" that demarcates the geographic boundary at which state jurisdiction
ceases to be absolute. Congress has statutorily defined Indian country to mean
any one of three things: (1) any land within the limit of an Indian reservation; (2)
"dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether
56. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
57. Id. at 561.
58. Justice Scalia's dismissive take on tribal sovereignty in a 2001 opinion, though perhaps not
shared by all of his colleagues, captures the extent of the shift: "Though tribes are often referred to
as 'sovereign' entities, it was long ago that the Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall's view
that the laws of a State can have no force within reservation boundaries. Ordinarily, it is now clear,
an Indian reservation is considered part of the territory of the State." Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353, 361-62 (2001).
59. For example, in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Court held that a tribe's criminal
jurisdiction did not extend to members of other Indian tribes who committed crimes on the tribe's
land-i.e., that a tribe only had criminal jurisdiction over its own members. Congress promptly
responded with an enactment providing that tribal criminal jurisdiction extended to both member
and nonmember Indians. See Pub. L. 101-511, § 8077(b)-(c), 104 Stat. 1856, 1892 (1990) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)).
15:2 (2015)
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within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof'; or (3) "all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished.6 -
These three categories require further explanation. The first category, Indian
reservations, applies to land that has been explicitly reserved by statute or treaty
for tribal use. The second category is the most nebulous and potentially broad of
the three, but it has been significantly cabined by the Supreme Court. In Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,61 the Court held that "dependent
Indian communities" "refers to a limited category of Indian lands that are neither
reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two requirements-first, they must
have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as
Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence."62 Thus, the
second category refers to lands that are similar to reservations because they were
set aside for tribal use and are subject to federal oversight. The third describes a
category of land created under a federal policy in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries that divided tribal land and allotted it to individual tribal
members.63 Though a significant portion of this allotted land was ultimately sold
to non-Indians, federal courts consider that which remains in Indian control to be
Indian country.
B. Civil Regulatory Authority in Indian Country
The legal question of broadest significance for the state public health official
is which entity, state or tribal government, has civil regulatory jurisdiction in
Indian country.64 Who has authority to institute social distancing measures, such
as quarantine or closure of public spaces? Who may require the seizure or
destruction of private property where necessary to abate a hazard? Who may
institute mandatory medical screenings and treatment? Civil regulatory
jurisdiction, one of the thorniest issues in an already complex body of law, lies at
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Although this statute formally defines the Indian country for
purposes of criminal jurisdiction, it has been utilized as well for questions of civil jurisdiction. See
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998).
61. Native Viii. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. at 520.
62. Id. at 527.
63. See Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
331 (2012)); see also Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 254-56 (1992) (discussing history of allotment policy). Congress eventually ceased
the practice of allotting tribal lands in 1934. See Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act,
Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
64. Outside of Indian country, it is settled that, absent an express statement of federal law to
the contrary, tribal members are subject to state law, provided that such law is nondiscriminatory.
See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 n.l 1 (1980) (citing Mescalero
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1978)).
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the heart of these and many other questions.65 Two distinct and not entirely
complementary legal frameworks govern the scope of tribal and state regulatory
jurisdiction in Indian country. While there are a few relatively firm precepts in
this area-one may, for example, generally presume a tribe's authority to
regulate its own membership within Indian country-many questions are not
susceptible to a uniform answer and must be assessed individually.
The leading modern authority on the extent of tribal civil regulatory
jurisdiction is the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in Montana v. United States.
66
There, the Court held that Montana's Crow Tribe lacked the power to regulate
hunting and fishing by non-Indians on lands within its reservation that were
owned in fee simple by non-Indians. The Court set forth a number of principles
that have endured to the present day, affirming that the "attributes of
sovereignty" possessed by tribes necessarily include the powers of self-
government over their own members. Among these powers was the authority "'to
prescribe and enforce criminal laws,' . . . "to determine tribal membership, to
regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance
for members.67 Those powers came close, however, to marking the furthest
reach of tribal sovereignty. The Court went on to hold that, without express
Congressional delegation, tribes ordinarily may not exercise any authority
"beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations."68 Thus, the Court established what amounts to a default rule dictating
that tribes lack jurisdiction to regulate the activities of nonmembers.
The Court added an important caveat to this default rule, suggesting in dicta
that there are two situations in which tribes "retain inherent sovereign power to
exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on non-Indian fee lands."69 The first permits a certain degree of tribal
regulation of nonmembers who "enter consensual relationships with the tribe or
its members.",70 The second reserves a tribe's "inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
65. See CONFERENCE OF W. ATrORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 106 (Joseph
P. Mazurek ed., 2d ed. 1998) ("Among the most difficult and recurring issues in Indian law is the
scope of tribal and state civil-regulatory authority in Indian country").
66. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
67. Id. at 564 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978)).
68. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 569 (1981).
69. Id. at 565.
70. Id. ("A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.").
15:2 (2015)
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the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."'71 Notwithstanding
the potential breadth of these two Montana exceptions, the Court has given them
a decidedly cramped reading to date.72 They have enjoyed greater currency in the
lower courts; for example, in a case decided shortly after Montana, the Ninth
Circuit applied both exceptions to uphold application of tribal building, health,
and safety regulations to a business owned and operated by a non-Indian on fee
land within a reservation.73
The question of the reach of state authority in Indian country is more
complicated. As the Supreme Court candidly acknowledged, "there is no rigid
rule by which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be
applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members.74 Rather, the Court has
adopted a case-by-case approach that weighs the state's interest in application of
its law within tribal borders against federal and tribal interests.75 According to the
Court, a state law that conflicts or interferes with federal and tribal interests is
preempted in Indian country unless the gravity of the state's regulatory interest
justifies the intrusion.76 Application in the individual case is less simple.
Where the conduct of tribal members in Indian country is concerned, the
analysis will typically (though not always) result in the preemption of state law,
for, as the Court has suggested, "the State's regulatory interest is likely to be
minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its
strongest. " 77 Far less predictable are those cases involving the conduct of non-
Indians within Indian country. Such cases, per the Supreme Court, require a
"particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at
stake," with close attention to the language of and policies underlying the federal
statutes and treaties relevant to the specific case.78 The Court has offered little
guidance on how to balance these competing interests, aside from a suggestion
that federal authorities should be read against the background "notions of
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of tribal
71. Id. at 566.
72. See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 329-41
(2008) (rejecting application of both Montana exceptions, and emphasizing their limited nature).
73. Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 365-67 (9th Cir. 1982).
74. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
75. As a matter of formal doctrine, the Court has suggested that there are "two independent but
related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members":
the preemptive force of federal law and the tribe's right to make its own laws and be ruled by them.
Id. at 142-43. The Court largely condensed these two concerns into a single analytical framework
to be applied in cases involving the application of state civil regulatory laws to Indian country.
76. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987).
77. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144.
78. Id. at 144-45.
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independence."7 9 The Court's analysis in individual cases has, consistent with its
articulated framework, been heavily rooted in the particular federal, tribal, and
state policies and interests at stake, and thus has generated little in the way of
generalizable principles.80 The Court has shown a willingness to hold state law
preempted even where it may apply to conduct by non-members, such as a
motor-carrier and fuel use tax that Arizona sought to levy on two non-Indian
corporations contracting with a tribe for on-reservation work.81 However, the
Court has also permitted narrow applications of state law to tribally operated
businesses that serve non-members, as in the case of tobacco taxes82 and liquor
licensure.
83
This contrast in precedent illustrates the legal uncertainty facing the state
public health official: in a typical case, neither state nor tribal government would
have plenary authority to carry out public health emergency response measures in
Indian country. Pursuant to its retained right of self-government, 84 a tribal
government would likely have authority to pursue emergency measures affecting
its own members-e.g., requiring mandatory medical screenings for tribal
members, or ordering the closure of tribal schools and daycares-provided that
its laws explicitly authorize such measures.85 By the same token, it is unlikely
that state emergency laws would reach tribal members living in Indian country
absent specific provisions in a treaty or federal law. 86 Beyond this, however, little
can be predicted with certitude. In light of Montana, a federal court would likely
not countenance a tribe's application of coercive or rights-limiting emergency
measures to non-members and their property.87 But state law may not apply in
79. Id. at 145; see also Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 719-20 (1983) (describing the role of
historical notions of tribal sovereignty as the backdrop for the preemption balancing analysis).
80. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 145-53; Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. at 214-22.
81. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. 136.
82. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463,
481-83 (1976) (holding that tribal smokeshop could be required to collect and remit state tobacco
taxes for sales to non-Indians).
83. See Rice, 463 U.S. 713 (upholding application of state licensure requirements for sale of
liquor by federally licensed Indian trader).
84. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
85. For examples of tribal code provisions outlining quarantine procedures and other
emergency public health authorities, see E. BAND CHEROKEE CODE §§ 130-5 (2011); NAVAJO
NATION CODE § 2101 (2002).
86. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144.
87. A court could, of course, find that the need for an effective response to public health
threats brings tribal emergency provisions with the second Montana exception, implicating a tribe's
"inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians ... when that conduct
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these situations either, leaving such individuals in a jurisdictional limbo: the mere
fact that tribes may not have jurisdiction over non-members living in Indian
country does not automatically establish the application of state law.
88
Jurisdiction over businesses that serve both tribal members and non-
members-such as hotels, restaurants, private schools, and daycares-present
particularly difficult questions. Consider the situation of an on-reservation,
tribally operated casino that serves predominantly non-tribal visitors. In the early
stages of a public health emergency, it is possible that state and tribal
governments might disagree as to the necessity of closure given the conflicting
interests at stake. Casinos represent a vital source of income for some tribes, but
they are also a congregating place for travelers that could facilitate the rapid
spread of a contagious disease. However great a risk a casino might pose, a state
may lack the authority to order its closure over tribal objection given the
particular legal framework for regulation of casinos in Indian country.
Conflict over regulation of Indian casinos first came to a head in the late
1980s when the Supreme Court reviewed a case involving the application of state
gaming laws to bingo operations by several tribes in California. The Court held
that, in light of the important federal and tribal interests in the revenue and
employment opportunities created by on-reservation gaming, state laws
regulating bingo could not reach the tribe's operations.89 Congress responded by
enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 90 The IGRA created a
regulatory regime that offered states some measure of control by largely limiting
tribal gaming to those types already permitted in a state and by requiring tribes to
negotiate a State-Tribal gaming compact prior to operating most casino-type
gaming.91 The IGRA suggests, but does not require, that a State-Tribal compact
include provisions clarifying the allocation of civil and criminal jurisdiction over
gaming activities.92 Absent such agreement, the IGRA makes clear that tribal
law, not state law, governs on-reservation gaming. 
93
88. One can imagine that particular exercises of state authority, even when applied to non-
members, might make for close cases under the Supreme Court's interest-balancing framework-
for example, measures involving the seizure, closure, or condemnation of real property within
Indian country.
89. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
90. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-5 (2012).
91. Id. §§ 2703(7)-(8), 2710(b)(1), (d)(l) (2012).
92. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (2012).
93. See id. § 2071(5) (2012) (finding that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate
gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law
and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy,
prohibit such gaming activity"); §§ 2710(a), (d)(4)-(5), 2713(d) (2012); see also S. REP. No. 100-
446, at 5-6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075 (describing the IGRA as a "a
framework for the regulation of gaming activities on Indian lands which provides that in the
17
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In a given situation, a state and tribe might address public health regulatory
authority for tribal casino operations in a State-Tribal compact. Such agreements,
however, might also be limited to the narrow regulation of the actual gambling
operations and not the associated accommodations. Absent any clear agreement,
jurisdiction would depend on a balancing of the interests at stake, which the
Senate's Indian Affairs Committee concisely outlined in its report recommending
passage of the IGRA:
A tribe's governmental interests include raising revenues to provide
governmental services for the benefit of the tribal community and reservation
residents, promoting public safety as well as law and order on tribal lands,
realizing the objectives of economic self-sufficiency and Indian self-
determination, and regulating activities of persons within its jurisdictional
borders. A State's governmental interests with respect to... gaming on Indian
lands include the interplay of such gaming with the State's public policy, safety,
law and other interests, as well as impacts on the State's regulatory system,
including its economic interest in raising revenue for its citizens.
94
At least one court has weighed these interests and determined that a county
government's public health and safety concerns cannot justify enforcement of the
county's health and safety regulations in an on-reservation casino.95 Others have
addressed the somewhat distinct question of jurisdiction over tort claims arising
from casino incidents; in doing so, these courts reached conflicting conclusions
on the extent of state jurisdiction. 96 These few decided cases fail to shed light on
how courts may determine jurisdiction in the context of a public health
emergency, where the state's governmental interests in public safety would be
significantly sharpened.
97
Any discussion of civil regulatory jurisdiction in Indian country must
exercise of its sovereign rights, unless a tribe affirmatively elects to have State laws and State
jurisdiction extend to tribal lands, the Congress will not unilaterally impose or allow State
jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of Indian gaming activities").
94. S. REP. No. 100-446, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3083.
95. See In re Sonoma Cnty. Fire Chief's Application, No. C 02-04873 JSW, 2005 WL
1005079 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2005).
96. Compare Muhammad v. Comanche Nation Casino, No. CIV-09-968-D, 2010 WL
4365568 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 27, 2010) (holding that tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
casino tort claims), with Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enters., 212 P.3d 447 (Okla. 2009) (holding
that tort claims arising from accidents in on-reservation casino may be brought in state courts).
97. Additionally, it is worth noting that federal law grants the Chairman of the National Indian
Gaming Commission certain authority to order temporary closure of gaming facilities. See 25
U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1) (2012). While the grounds for that authority are limited, they include violations
of tribal ordinances, id. § 2713(b) (2012), which could provide a basis for federal closure of a
casino to the extent that tribal public health provisions were implicated.
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acknowledge the existence of 25 U.S.C. § 231, a long dormant federal statute.
Enacted in 1929, the statute authorizes the Secretary of the Interior98 to prescribe
regulations permitting the agents or employees of a state to enter Indian country
for the purpose of, among other things, "making inspection of health . . .
conditions and enforcing sanitation and quarantine regulations."99 No regulation
has ever been promulgated under 25 U.S.C. § 231.100 However, even absent
implementing regulations, at least one court interpreted § 231 to be an expression
of Congressional intent to transfer plenary public health regulatory jurisdiction
over Indian country to the states.'0' The impact of the statute on the balance of
Indian and state public health regulatory jurisdiction has never been directly
presented in a court case. A broad view of § 231 seems unlikely to prevail today,
given that state authority under § 231 is contingent on an act of federal delegation
that has not occurred in over eighty years.
C. Authority of State Officials to Enter Indian Country
Closely related to civil regulatory jurisdiction is the question of the authority
of state officials to enter Indian country, whether to investigate public health
threats, enforce state emergency measures, or deliver aid (such as antivirals or
food). Federal courts have long recognized that tribes possess a landowner's
"traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they deem to be
98. The responsibilities of the Secretary with respect to Indian public health have since been
transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services. See 42 U.S.C. § 2001 (2012).
99. 25 U.S.C. § 231 (2012).
100. See Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 550 F.2d
443, 446 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has
proposed regulations under § 231 that would allow the Director of the CDC, with the concurrence
of the Indian Health Service Director and after consulting with the affected tribes, to authorize state
officials to enter Indian country, but only for the sole purpose of enforcing federal quarantine
regulations. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71892 (proposed No. 30, 2005)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70 & 71). The regulations have not been adopted.
101. See Anderson v. Gladden, 188 F. Supp. 666, 677 (D. Or. 1960) (suggesting in dicta that §
261 "surrendered to the states all jurisdiction over Indians and Indian Reservations in the field of
health and education and gave the states, through the Secretary of the Interior, complete jurisdiction
in connection with enforcing sanitation and quarantine regulations and compulsory school
attendance in such field"). While this may be the broadest extant reading of § 261, it is not alone in
overlooking the federal authorization necessary for states to exercise public health authority in
Indian country. See, e.g., Snohomish Cnty. v. Seattle Disposal Co., 425 P.2d 22 (Wash. 1967)
(suggesting in dicta that § 231 granted the states "jurisdiction to inspect and regulate health,
sanitation, and related matters on Indian tribal lands"); Acosta v. San Diego Cnty., 272 P.2d 92, 97
(Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (suggesting in dicta that § 231 authorizes the states "to enter upon Indian lands
for the purpose of making inspection of health and educational conditions and enforcing sanitation
and quarantine regulations").
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undesirable from tribal lands."10 2 This right of exclusion was generally
understood to extend to state officials 10 3 until the Supreme Court's 2001 decision
in Hicks v. Nevada.'°4 In Hicks, the Court introduced considerable uncertainty
into the question of whether state officials have authority to enter and carry out
their responsibilities in Indian country.
Hicks came before the Court on a question of tribal court jurisdiction; the
operative issue was whether a tribal court could exercise jurisdiction over claims
by a member of the Fallon Paiute-Soshone Tribes, Floyd Hicks, against various
Nevada state game wardens.0 5 Acting on information suggesting that Hicks
illegally killed a California bighorn sheep off-reservation, the game wardens
executed search warrants on Hicks' property on two separate occasions.
10 6
Because Hicks resided on the Tribes' reservation, the wardens took the
precaution in both instances of procuring a tribal-court warrant in addition to a
state-issued warrant.107 They did not find incriminating evidence on either
occasion. The searches resulted in damage to Hicks's property, leading Hicks to
bring suit in tribal court against the tribal court judge, various tribal officers, and
Nevada's game wardens, alleging various violations of his rights. 108 The wardens
and the State of Nevada filed a declaratory judgment action in the Federal
District Court seeking a declaration that the tribal courts lacked jurisdiction.109
Both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit ruled against the state, finding the
tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction proper. 110 The Supreme Court disagreed.
The determinative issue for the Court was whether the Tribes' regulatory
102. Reina, 495 U.S. at 698; see also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
333 (1983) ("A tribe's authority to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on
the reservation is ... well established.").
103. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 196 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The tribal court was free
to exclude state officials engaged in law enforcement activities on the reservation."), rev'd, 533
U.S. 353 (2001); Cnty. of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that, in
entering into law enforcement agreement with State, tribe "gave up its landowner's right to exclude
state officials engaged in law enforcement activities on the reservation."); Miccosukee Tribe of
Indians of Fla. v. United States, No. 00-3453C1V, 2000 WL 35623105 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2000)
(holding that State Attorney could not effectuate service of process on tribal land); see also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (holding that "the citizens of Georgia have no right
to enter" the territory of the Cherokee nation "but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or
in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of [C]ongress").
104. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 353.
105. Id. at 355.
106. Id. at 356.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 357. This followed rulings by the tribal court and a tribal appeals court that the
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jurisdiction extended to the on-reservation conduct of the state game wardens."'
Applying Montana,"2 the Court asked whether regulation of state officials
executing search warrants for off-reservation crimes was essential to tribal self-
government or internal relations."3 The Court held that it was not.l l4 In the
course of reaching that conclusion, the Court offered some strong indications
(arguably dicta' 5) of how it would resolve the converse question' H6: the scope of
a state official's authority to enter tribal land in execution of his duties. While
acknowledging that state regulatory authority will not generally reach the
activities of tribal members on tribal land, the Court noted that it had, upon
occasion, found state regulation appropriate where the state's off-reservation
interests are implicated-as, for example, in permitting states to require tribal
businesses to collect state cigarette taxes from nonmembers, or allowing state
jurisdiction over crimes committed by members off-reservation. 117 Past cases had
left unanswered the question of whether the State's regulatory authority in such
circumstances "entails the corollary right to enter a reservation (including Indian
fee lands) for enforcement purposes."' 8 At least in the case at bar--execution of
a search warrant for an alleged off-reservation crime-the Court suggested that it
did. Relying on a pair of cases from the nineteenth century, the Hicks Court
found indications that the "process" of state courts had historically been
understood to extend to Indian country, and reasoned that such "process" likely
included the authority to issue search warrants for off-reservation conduct. " 9
111. Id. at 358. The Court had previously held that a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction cannot
extend beyond its legislative jurisdiction, and thus, the Court reasoned, the absence of the latter
would necessarily mean the absence of the former. Id. at 357-58 (citing Strate v. A-I Contractors,
520 U.S. 438,453 (1997)).
112. See supra Part ll.B.
113. The Court categorically rejected the application of the other Montana exception (relating
to regulation of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe), Hicks, 533 U.S. at
359 n.3, noting that the exception "obviously" was not intended to apply to "[s]tates or state
officers acting in their governmental capacity," id. at 371-72.
114. It would risk understatement o note that the Hicks decision was, and continues to be,
controversial. In a reaction that typifies the decision's scholarly reception, one academic
characterized Hicks as "a stunning example of how [the Court] pursues the Justices' larger agendas
in Indian cases while ignoring and misapplying Indian law principles." David H. Getches, Beyond
Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream
Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 329-30 (2001).
115. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 679 N.W.2d 484, 488-89 (S.D. 2004) (characterizing as
dicta the Court's discussion in Hicks of state authority to enter Indian country).
116. See Jones ex rel. Murray v. Norton, No. 2:09-cv-00730-TC-SA, 2010 WL 2990829, at
*3 (D. Utah July 26, 2010) (observing that "Hicks concerned tribal authority rather than the
authority of the state").
117. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362.
118. Id. at 363.
119. Id. at 363-64.
21
Barnard: Responding to Public Health Emergencies on Tribal Lands: Jurisdic
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
For the state official whose duties may take him into Indian country, Hicks
leaves many open questions. 120 There is considerable uncertainty even when, as
in Hicks, investigation of off-reservation crimes is at issue. In a 2004 case, for
example, the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of evidence
obtained from a tribal member during a traffic stop after a state officer pursued
him onto a reservation for an off-reservation traffic offense.'2 1 In so doing, the
court distinguished Hicks on the grounds that "in Hicks, tribal sovereignty was
being used as a sword against state officers" whereas here "tribal sovereignty
[was] being used as a shield to protect the Tribe's sovereignty from incursions by
the State."'
' 22
Beyond the narrow criminal investigation context of Hicks, it is difficult to
say what authority, if any, state officials may exercise in Indian country. 123 The
Court in Hicks acknowledged this open question and suggested that any action by
state officials unrelated to law enforcement "is potentially subject to tribal
control depending on the outcome of [the] Montana analysis."'24 Nonetheless,
one may extrapolate at least two general principles from Hicks. First, a tribe's
authority to regulate or exclude state officers from Indian country will be related
to the scope of the state's regulatory jurisdiction over the matter at issue.125
Thus, where the state's claim of regulatory authority is strongest--e.g., over
nonmembers on fee land-state officials are most likely to have authority to enter
Indian country to carry out their duties. Where it is weakest-over tribal
members on reserved or tribally owned land-a state official's authority is most
in question.
Second, the mere fact of state regulatory jurisdiction does not necessarily
grant authority for state officials to enter Indian country. In Hicks, the Supreme
Court did not locate the state wardens' authority to execute warrants in Indian
country in the states' general criminal jurisdiction over off-reservation crimes.
120. Indeed, the Court took pains to confine its decision in Hicks to the precise circumstances
before it. See id. at 358 n.2 ("Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court
jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law.").
121. State v. Cummings, 679 N.W.2d 484,484 (S.D. 2004).
122. Id. at 487. But see State v. Harrison, 238 P.3d 869 (N.M. 2010) (holding on similar facts
that state officer had authority to pursue tribal member onto reservation and obtain evidence of
DWI violation).
123. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has taken a very narrow view of Hicks, characterizing it
as a single, limited exception to a tribe's general power to exclude nonmembers from tribal land.
See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area v. Larance, 642 F.3d 802, 813 (9th Cir. 2011).
124. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 373 (2001).
125. The questions of state and tribal regulatory jurisdiction are, to be sure, distinct and not
entirely complementary. However, Hicks suggests that a determination of the importance to tribal
self-government of regulating state officials will depend on the extent of the state's authority in the
substantive area at issue. See id. at 360-65.
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Rather, the Court relied on case precedent regarding the extension of state court
"process" to tribal lands.'26 Consider state taxation of on-reservation cigarette
sales to nonmembers, an area in which states have unambiguous authority to
regulate Indian country conduct. Rather than acting within Indian country, state
officials typically seize cigarettes outside of tribal borders.127 To the extent that
this evinces a possible gap between regulatory authority and enforcement
authority in Indian country, a distinction between the two would not be
surprising. Ratifying the extension of state laws to Indian country is a lesser
offense to Indian sovereignty, at least symbolically, than is authorizing state
officials to actually enter and enforce those laws over tribal objection.
The uncertainties here can be addressed through express agreements with the
tribes as to the authority of state officials in Indian country. 28 Absent such an
agreement, however, significant questions concerning the ability of state officials
to enter Indian country will persist. This lack of clarity may impede coordination
of an effective response to a public health emergency.
D. Adjudicatory Authority in Indian Country
Issues of adjudicatory authority may arise from public health emergencies in
Indian country in two situations: (1) where judicial orders (such as temporary
restraining orders) are needed to implement emergency authorities; and (2) in
subsequent litigation related to an emergency response (e.g., tort claims for
injuries suffered by responders or property damaged in a response). At the
broadest level, the scope of adjudicatory authority should mirror the scope of
civil regulatory authority, but this becomes considerably less clear when
considered in light of the details of litigating a case. The following is a brief
overview of the law on adjudicatory jurisdiction.
The leading Supreme Court case on the adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribal
126. Id. at 363-64.
127. See, e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1180-83 (10th Cir. 2012)
(affirming legality of state's practice of seizing cigarettes lacking state tax stamp en route to a
reservation); see also Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 514 (1991) (noting that "States may ... collect the sales tax from cigarette wholesalers,
either by seizing unstamped cigarettes off the reservation or by assessing wholesalers who supplied
unstamped cigarettes to the tribal stores." (internal citation omitted)). Indeed, in Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 162 (1980), the Supreme Court
expressly reserved (and has not subsequently answered) the question of whether state officials
could enter a reservation to seize cigarettes.
128. See, e.g., Cnty. of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1998) (describing an
Agreement under which "county law enforcement officers (as agents of the state) have an express
right to come onto the reservation and exercise jurisdiction over Indians. They have authority to
patrol the reservation, investigate minor crimes and make arrests.").
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courts, Strate v. A-] Contractors,129 arose from an accident between two non-
Indians on a state highway running through the Fort Berthold Reservation in
North Dakota. The accident produced a tort suit in tribal court, a declaratory
judgment action in federal court, and, ultimately, an opportunity for the Supreme
Court to assess the scope of the tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction. The Court
rejected a reading of its precedents that would grant a tribe adjudicatory authority
over nonmembers in situations where it lacked regulatory authority. Rather, the
Court held that a tribe's adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers does not
exceed its regulatory jurisdiction. 130 The Court thus applied its Montana analysis
(governing the scope of tribal regulatory jurisdiction) to determine whether
adjudicatory jurisdiction over the subject tort suit was proper. 131 The Strate Court
held that the minimal tribal interests at stake could not justify jurisdiction over a
suit between nonmembers. 1
32
While establishing that a tribe may not adjudicate where it lacks the power
to regulate, Strate leaves unresolved the question of whether a tribe's
adjudicatory authority may in fact be narrower than its regulatory authority.
133
Following Strate, courts have generally treated the two as coextensive, applying
Montana to determine whether adjudicatory jurisdiction properly lies with a
tribal court. This approach is particularly likely to prevail where adjudication is
directly incident to a proper exercise of tribal regulatory authority-as would be
the case, for instance, if a temporary restraining order were sought to enforce an
emergency order issued by tribal authorities and directed at tribal members.
There is greater room for question when the object of the tribe's regulatory
authority diverges from the subject matter of the adjudication. For example, a
court could find that a tribe has the regulatory authority to exclude state public
health officials from tribal land, but lacks adjudicatory jurisdiction over tort suits
arising from acts by such officials on tribal land. 1
34
129. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
130. Id. at 453.
131. Id. at 456-59.
132. Id.
133. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 358 n.2 (2001).
134. The question of adjudicatory jurisdiction over state officials is, to be clear, an open
question; it is certainly possible that state officials who caused injury to individuals or property in
carrying out emergency response measures in Indian country would be subject to suit in tribal
court. In Hicks, the Supreme Court barred jurisdiction over suits against state officials in one
narrow area-execution of search warrants for off-reservation crimes-but preserved the
possibility that suit against state officials in tribal court might be proper in other circumstances. Id.
at 373. Tribal court jurisdiction over such a suit would perhaps more likely be found proper where a
state official acted beyond the scope of his or her proper jurisdiction. Cf id. at 386 (Ginsburg, J.
concurring) (noting possibility of tribal court jurisdiction over "state officials engaged on tribal
land in a venture or frolic of their own").
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Similarly, state court jurisdiction over matters pertaining to Indian country,
such as torts occurring in the conduct of public health emergency operations,
mirrors state regulatory authority. Thus, absent a specific enactment by Congress,
determination of state adjudicatory jurisdiction rests on the same nebulous
interest-balancing test135 used to assess the reach of state regulatory
jurisdiction. 136
A significant complicating factor with respect to state court jurisdiction is a
1953 Congressional enactment commonly referred to as P.L. 280, which
transferred civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country to five states, and
also permitted other states to electively assume jurisdiction.1 37 While the basic
jurisdictional transfer effected by Public Law 280 is relatively clear,'38 giving
state courts jurisdiction over "civil causes of action between Indians or to which
Indians are parties which arise in... Indian country,"' 39 the enactment left in its
wake some difficult questions regarding the law to be applied in such cases.1
4
0
Moreover, Public Law 280 allowed states that voluntarily assumed jurisdiction
over Indian country to exercise partial rather than full jurisdiction. 141 This means
that, in some states, determining which sovereign has adjudicatory jurisdiction in
Indian country may depend not only on the identity of the parties, but also on the
135. See supra Part 11.B.
136. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, P.C., 467 U.S.
138, 147-50 (1984) (applying balancing analysis articulated in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 136 (1980) to question of state court jurisdiction); AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK, supra note 65, at 154-58 (concluding that same substantive analysis is used for
questions of state adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction).
137. See Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012), 28
U.S.C. § 1360 (2012)). The five states to which P.L. 280 transferred jurisdiction are California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin; subsequent legislation added Alaska to the list.
138. It must be noted that individual questions of jurisdiction under P.L. 280 can be quite
involved, as there are specific exceptions in law even for the so-called "mandatory" states named in
the statute. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2012) (carving out specific communities, such as the
Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon, from the general transfer of jurisdiction).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2012).
140. Two basic choice-of-law issues may be encountered in civil cases arising from Indian
country in P.L. 280 jurisdictions. First, P.L. 280 specifically provided for the continued application
of tribal law "if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the State," necessitating close
analysis of whether tribal law is, in fact, consistent with state law. 28 U.S.C.§ 1360(c) (2012).
Second, the Supreme Court has held that P.L. 280 did not "confer general state civil regulatory
control over Indian reservations," and thus certain regulatory measures (such as taxes) cannot be
imposed on Indians solely on P.L. 280's authority. See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 384
(1976). The line between regulatory laws and laws that may be properly applied in Indian country
cases is, unsurprisingly, not always clear. See AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 65, at
160.
141. See Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463
(1979) (rejecting challenge to Washington's partial assumption ofjurisdiction over Indian country
pursuant to P.L. 280).
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type of action or claim being filed.
E. Criminal Jurisdiction in Indian Country
State public health officials will be less concerned with the boundaries of
federal, tribal, and state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country than with matters
of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless, issues of criminal jurisdiction may arise where
state or tribal codes prescribe criminal penalties for violation of emergency
response measures, such as quarantine.
As a general matter, criminal jurisdiction in Indian country "is governed by a
complex patchwork of federal, state, and tribal law," 142 application of which
depends upon, among other things, the identities of perpetrators and (if any)
victims. The starting place for most jurisdictional analyses is 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
That statute extends to Indian country the "general laws of the United States" that
apply to crimes committed in federal enclaves, giving the federal government
general jurisdiction, with some significant exceptions. The statute does not apply
to "offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another
Indian," over which the tribes have exclusive jurisdiction (as to minor crimes), 
143
"nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian country who has been
punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations,
the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian
tribes respectively." 144 While this federal statute might be read to leave no place
for state criminal jurisdiction, a long line of Supreme Court precedent assigns
states exclusive jurisdiction over crimes involving only non-Indians but
committed in Indian country.145 Moreover, with respect to civil adjudicatory
jurisdiction, Public Law 280 transferred criminal jurisdiction over Indian country
crimes to five states, and permitted other states to assume jurisdiction in whole or
part. 146
This Article does not purport to fully map the overlapping lines of criminal
jurisdiction, as the type of criminal offense that may arise from a public health
emergency presents a special and narrow case-albeit one with some
complications of its own. Public health offenses of this ilk (e.g., violation of
quarantine) are victimiess crimes. Although a violation of a public health
142. Durov. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,680 n.1 (1990), superseded by statute, Pub. L. 101-511, 104
Stat. 1892 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012)).
143. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). A separate statute gives the federal government exclusive
jurisdiction over major crimes such as murder and kidnapping between Indians. See 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (2012).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012).
145. See Reina, 495 U.S. at 680 n.1.
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2012); see also supra note 137.
15:2 (2015)
26
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 15 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol15/iss2/1
RESPONDING TO PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES ON TRIBAL LANDS
emergency measure might pose a threat of serious societal harm, a distinctive
characteristic of such an offense is that the violation itself has no immediate
victim. For violations committed by non-ndians, it is relatively clear as a matter
of law that victimless crimes come within state jurisdiction. 147 When the offender
is a tribal member, the matter is not so clear. Whereas section 1152 leaves
jurisdiction over lower-level crimes between Indians to tribes, the statute is silent
as to victimless crimes by Indians. Case law is split as to whether or not such
crimes fall exclusively within tribal jurisdiction. 148 Even assuming section 1152
applies to at least some victimless crimes by Indians, tribes would still retain
concurrent jurisdiction under their own laws to punish violations of public health
emergency measures by Indians149-and, pursuant to section 1152, punishment
under tribal law would deprive the federal government of jurisdiction. However,
this does not foreclose the possibility of the federal government prosecuting an
Indian offender under the "general laws of the United States." This phrase refers
not to the generally applicable laws that apply anywhere in the United States, but
rather the laws applied in federal enclaves. The applicable law is primarily state
law, as the federal Assimilative Crimes Act5 ° largely incorporates the
substantive criminal law of the state or territory in which a federal enclave is
located. So, at least in theory, under section 1152, the federal government could
prosecute an Indian for violation of a state quarantine law. 1
5'
147. See, e.g., United States v. Langford, 641 F.3d 1195, 1197-99 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding
that state had exclusive jurisdiction over prosecution of non-Indian for being spectator at a
cockfight in Indian country); People v. Collins, 826 N.W.2d 175, (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (holding
that state had jurisdiction over prosecution of non-Indians for possession of controlled substance in
Indian country).
148. Compare United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (Indian-against-Indian exception
includes the arguably victimless offense of adultery committed between Indians), and United States
v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 386 n.4 (8th Cir. 1983) (citing Quiver and noting that § 1152's "Indian
against Indian exception has been read very broadly to include 'victimless crimes' affecting only
Indians"), with United States v. Thunder Hawk, 127 F.3d 705, 708-09 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
offense of driving under the influence fell outside of the Indian-against-Indian exception and
distinguishing Quiver on the grounds that it involved "domestic relations, an area traditionally left
to tribal self-government"), and United States v. Sosseur, 181 F.2d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 1950)
(United States had jurisdiction to prosecute Indian defendant for illegally operating slot machines).
See also AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 65, at 91 (noting that it "appears doubtful"
that the Indian-against-Indian exception applies to all victimless crimes by Indians).
149. See, e.g., CHEROKEE CODE § 130-6(f) (2011) (prescribing criminal penalties for violation
of quarantine or isolation orders), id. at § 130-13 (2011) (authorizing arrest to enforce quarantine
ordinance).
150. Codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2012).
151. This is exceedingly unlikely for any number of reasons, not least among them that the
federal government has its own quarantine authority in Indian country and is thus unlikely to rely
upon state enactments. See 25 U.S.C. § 198 (2012) (granting broad authority to isolate or
quarantine "any Indian afflicted with tuberculosis, trachoma, or other contagious or infectious
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This example raises a second distinguishing characteristic of this type of
public health offense: it is merely an enforcement mechanism for a set of civil
regulatory authorities. Given the low likelihood that a court would find state
public health emergency laws applicable to tribal members in Indian country at
all, it seems perverse to suggest that the federal government could use section
1152 to bootstrap those laws into Indian country. Indeed, case law interpreting
the Assimilative Crimes Act has found that the statute only imports a state's
prohibitory laws, not its regulatory laws.152 Courts have made the same
distinction in interpreting the reach of Public Law 280's transfer of criminal
jurisdiction to the states.53 According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
essence of this distinction is whether the state statute at issue is "intended to
prohibit particular conduct in order to promote the general welfare," or rather is
"primarily a licensing law aimed at regulating particular conduct." 154 A state law
penalizing noncompliance with a public health emergency measure does not fit
easily into one category or the other. However, it is very likely that, where the
penal provision is merely an aid to a civil regulatory system-and where a
violation cannot exist without the state first exercising its regulatory authority by
issuing a quarantine order or other emergency measure-a court would find the
law itself regulatory and thus not applicable to tribal members in Indian
country. 1
55
Though no formal regulatory/prohibitory distinction controls the reach of
state criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country, enforcement of a
state law penalizing a violation of an emergency measure such as a quarantine
order presupposes state authority to apply the measure in the first place. Thus,
whether a state has the criminal enforcement authority as against a non-Indian
necessarily depends upon whether the state's civil regulatory jurisdiction extends
to Indian country in the individual circumstances at hand. This determination
diseases").
152. See United States v. Dotson, 615 F.3d 1162, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2010).
153. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207-14 (1987).
Accordingly, the ability of a state that has assumed jurisdiction under P.L. 280 to criminally
enforce its public health emergency laws in Indian country will turn on whether such laws are
deemed prohibitory or regulatory.
154. Dotson, 615 F.3d at 1168 (quoting United States v. Clark, 195 F.3d 446, 450 (9th Cir.
1999)).
155. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, the rationale for the argument that regulatory offenses
should be carved out from the Assimilative Crimes Act is that Congress did not intend to allow "a
state [to] enforce its regulatory system on the federal jurisdiction by making criminal any failure to
comply with those regulations (i.e., licenses, permits, etc.)." Clark, 195 F.3d at 450 (quoting
United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1977)). That said, in Clark, the court
found a state law criminalizing the unlicensed practice of law prohibitory in nature, even though the
law was, arguably, closely tied to the state's professional licensing regulation. Id. at 449-50.
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would rely on the interest-balancing analysis described in Part II.B above.
Generally, tribes have criminal jurisdiction over violations by Indians of
their own public health laws (possibly concurrent with the federal
government).156 A state's plenary jurisdiction over crimes involving only non-
Indians may furnish the state with some authority to enforce criminal violations
of state public health laws in Indian country. However, as with most other
questions of federal Indian law, those general principles may give way in the
specific circumstances of an individual case.
III. NAVIGATING JURISDICTIONAL UNCERTAINTY IN PRACTICE: THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT
Most state or tribal officials who have occasion to interact with their
governmental counterparts should be familiar with the challenges thus far
discussed, as well as with the negotiation of intergovernmental agreements
(IGAs). This Part briefly introduces the concept of the intergovernmental
agreement and makes the case for its application to the context of public health
emergency authorities.
The Indian law scholar David Getches has referred to intergovernmental
agreements as a "device of necessity" for tribes and neighboring governments.157
An IGA is an agreement or memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiated
between a tribe and a neighboring government to clarify some aspect of their
legal relationship. In some cases, these agreements permit cooperation and
sharing of resources. The use of IGAs with tribes in the United States is
widespread. They address such diverse subjects as law enforcement authorities,
water rights, regulation of hunting and fishing, taxation, waste disposal,
economic development, and social service delivery. 58 IGAs help "close the gap
between concepts of sovereignty and the necessities of governance," and, at their
best, function to "give practical meaning to broad legal principles, to effectuate
court decisions and legislative delegations of authority, and to clarify ambiguous
laws."' 59
The exigencies of a public health emergency make IGAs, and the clarity
156. Note that, even where jurisdiction over an offender lies with the state, tribal officers "may
exercise their power to detain the offender and transport him to the proper authorities." Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 697 (1990). Thus, tribal officers could likely assist in enforcement of a state
public health order against non-Indians.
157. Getches, supra note 44, at 121.
158. See id. at 122; AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 65, at 404-30; Frank R.
Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. REV. 239, 258-67 (1991).
159. Getches, supra note 44, at 121.
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they can provide, particularly attractive. 160 However, there may be limitations to
what can be accomplished through direct negotiation between a tribe and a
neighboring state or local government. Jurisdictional uncertainty is perhaps the
most obvious, though not the only,'1 61 impetus for a state to negotiate an IGA with
a tribe addressing responses to public health emergencies in Indian country.
Federal and state laws generate, rather than answer, questions as to who has
jurisdiction to pursue emergency response measures in areas that are likely to be
of concern to state public health officials. This "uncertainty leaves tribes, state
governments, and local governments to act at their peril, not knowing whether
assertions of jurisdiction will be upheld or not." 1
62
Even in instances where the law is be more settled, differences in the
perception of the extent of tribal sovereignty may necessitate a cooperative
agreement between tribe and state to clarify responsibilities and authorities. It has
been said that "[t]he success of any legal system depends upon its acceptance by
the people to whom it applies."163 Given the coercive nature of many public
health emergency measures-which may require holding individuals against their
will, entering or destroying property, or closing down public spaces and
businesses-the perceived legitimacy and acceptance of the implementing
government's authority seems especially critical to the success of the response.
Indeed, disputes over tribal sovereignty have ended in armed stand-offs between
tribal members and the local, state, and federal government officials. 
164
Public health emergencies afford little opportunity to resolve legal
uncertainty or to reconcile conflicting understandings of the scope of tribal
160. Even outside of the tribal context, the importance of intergovernmental agreements to
public health emergency response has widely been noted. See, e.g., Daniel D. Stier & Richard A.
Goodman, Mutual Aid Agreements: Essential Legal Tools for Public Health Preparedness and
Response, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S62 (2007); Hogan et al., supra note 2, at 39.
161. In states where transfer of allotments has created extensive "checkerboarding" of Indian
and non-Indian lands, the practical challenges of regulating and policing these fragmented
jurisdictions may also serve as a strong motivation to form intergovernmental agreements. See
Riley, supra note 3, at 1731.
162. Getches, supra note 44, at 143.
163. KARL LLEWELLYN & EDWARD ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND
CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE 239 (1941).
164. For example, in 1976, amidst a jurisdictional dispute, members of the Oneida Nation in
New York barricaded the road leading onto the Oneida's land and refused to let local police
officers pass. Ray Halbritter & Steven Paul McSloy, Empowerment or Dependence? The Practical
Value and Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 531, 559-60
(1994). Another high-profile incident took place in 1973, when there was a seventy-one-day stand-
off between members of the American Indian Movement and local, state, and federal authorities
over issues relating to the federal government's treaty obligations with the Sioux Nation. See Scott
R. Tkacz, Note, In Katrina's Wake: Rethinking the Military's Role in Domestic Emergencies, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 301,310 (2006).
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sovereignty. While a state or tribal government might petition a court for
emergency authority, that court may be unable or unwilling to expeditiously
clarify complicated and politically sensitive jurisdictional issues. Moreover, state
and tribal officials may lack the time and resources to brief complex questions of
law amidst a crisis. Even if a court were to quickly resolve a jurisdictional
dispute, the prevailing government would likely find implementation of its
emergency authority difficult or impossible without the cooperation of the other
sovereign.
The potential challenges of working through jurisdictional issues during an
active emergency only serve to highlight the value of an IGA. Such an
agreement, instituted before an active emergency, would establish and specify
roles, responsibilities, and authorities to which the involved governments could
agree. Negotiating an agreement in advance allows a tribe and state or local
government to clarify the application of broad and uncertain jurisdictional
principles in very specific contexts likely to arise in a public health emergency.
Additionally, the process of negotiation may foster a cooperative relationship
between tribal and state or local governments that the involved governments can
codify in an IGA or pledge of mutual assistance. 165
While the practical dividends of negotiating such an agreement are plain,
there is some question as to the legal status and enforceability of an
intergovernmental agreement between tribal and state or local governments. In
certain areas-such as the disposition of tribal lands or trust property' 66-federal
law explicitly prohibits the formation of agreements with tribes absent federal
approval. Federal law also expressly authorizes states and tribal governments to
negotiate compacts on certain subjects, such as tribal gaming 16' and child custody
proceedings. 161 In areas not reached by federal statute, it is not clear whether an
agreement directly negotiated between a tribe and a state or local government
(without federal involvement) has any legal force. 169 For the most part,
165. See Pommersheim, supra note 158, at 268 (noting that the goal of negotiating
intergovernmental agreements is not just "to narrow the band of likely areas of litigation," but also,
"as part of that process, to increase mutual respect and the ability to solve common problems").
166. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).
167. See id. § 2710(d)(3) (2012).
168. See id. § 1919 (2012).
169. Compare AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 65, at 406 ("Generally,
cooperative agreements that do not involve tribal lands or trust property do not require federal
approval..."), and Getches, supra note 44, at 145 ("Neither federal permission or federal approval
is generally required for interjurisdictional agreements"), with Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Goodson
Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-to-Government Relations to Foster Reservation
Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295, 1305, 1313 (1993) (noting that it is unclear both
whether federal approval is required for state-tribal cooperative agreements and whether such
agreements are enforceable), and Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law:
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enforceability is beside the point; the primary value of an agreement is its
clarification of expectations, procedures, and roles. Whether or not such
agreements have the force of law on their own, it is often impracticable to obtain
judicial enforcement of agreement obligations during an emergency. However,
where a provision lasts longer than the emergency itself-disclaimers of liability
for actions taken during a response, or provisions for reimbursement-the
question of enforceability is more likely to come before a court.
Finally, there is the question of an agreement's validity under the laws of the
governmental parties entering into it. Many states have statutes that specifically
authorize their administrative agencies and/or local governments to form
agreements with tribes.170 Tribal constitutions may also contain provisions
specifying the authority, procedures, or circumstances for entering into
agreements with other governmental entities.17 1 While compliance with state and
tribal procedures will not resolve the question of an agreement's validity under
federal law, it will at the very least increase the likelihood that the agreement
would survive judicial scrutiny.
IV. INCIDENCE OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN TRIBES AND STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
In recent years, many states have increased their focus on trans-border
coordination with tribes on public health and other issues. This is manifest in
strengthened tribal consultation policies, funding agreements, and engagement
with tribes on regional and state emergency planning. Though these efforts have
no doubt improved cooperation between the tribes and their neighboring
governments, they have not necessarily generated comprehensive agreement on
the difficult jurisdictional issues addressed in the preceding sections.
The following are the results of a preliminary investigation of the incidence
of IGAs on public health emergency measures between tribes and states or local
governments. Part V draws on publicly available agreements and the author's
Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 924 (1999) ("Federal statutes and caselaw
restrict the lawful authority of tribes and states to make binding agreements between themselves,
and prohibit almost all tribal-state compacts absent approval by the Secretary of Interior"). Even if
an intergovernmental agreement were not directly enforceable, it might have some weight in the
balancing of state, federal, and tribal interests utilized to determine the scope of state civil authority
in Indian country. See supra Part II.B.
170. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-103 (2014); WASH. RIV. CODE ANN. §§
39.34.020(1), 39.34.030 (2015). At least one state has a provision specifically authorizing state
agencies to form agreements with tribes to implement public health emergency response measures.
SeeN.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-1OA-18 (2014).
171. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE COLO. RIVER INDIAN TRIBES art. VI, § 1; CONST. OF THE TOHONO
O'ODHAM NATION art. VI, § l(0.
15:2 (2015)
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own discussions with public health officials and nonprofit public health
organizations in Arizona, Maine, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Washington
regarding planning efforts with tribes in those states.72 The investigation
uncovered a number of IGAs, which can be coarsely assigned into two
categories: those that comprehensively address aid to be given or roles and
responsibilities during a public health emergency, and those that address more
discrete matters or facilitate preparedness activities more generally.
Given the relatively small sample of officials contacted and states surveyed,
this Article cannot-and does not purport to-offer a comprehensive picture of
planning efforts nationwide. There may be many more jurisdictions that have
addressed, or are in the process of addressing, emergency response authorities
and responsibilities. Insofar as the states included have within their borders some
of the largest tribes in the country, the paucity of agreements between these states
and neighboring tribes addressing substantive jurisdictional issues suggests that
there is more work to be done in this arena.
A. Comprehensive Mutual Aid Agreements
Of the IGAs analyzed for this Article, only those from the State of
Washington comprehensively address the exchange of aid and/or delineation of
responsibilities and authorities between tribal and neighboring governments
during a public health emergency. In the interest of coherence, the agreements
are ordered according to degree of devolution of public health response authority
by the tribal party: substantial devolution, contingent devolution, and no
devolution.
At one end of the continuum is an MOU between the Snoqualmie Indian
Tribe and the Public Health Department for Seattle and King County. 73 The
agreement states upfront that "this MOU is not a legally binding document, but
rather signifies the belief and commitment of the signator[ies] . . . that in the
event of a region-wide disaster, the needs of the community may be best met if
they cooperate and coordinate their response efforts."'174 The agreement
contemplates three areas of cooperation: (i) communication and coordination of
response efforts during an emergency between the parties' respective health
officers; (ii) an annual meeting and ongoing communication to address
emergency response issues outside the context of an actual emergency; and (iii)
172. Most of these states were chosen for their significant tribal populations.
173. Intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding, Pub. Health-Seattle & King Cnty.,
Snoqualmie Indian Tribe, Oct. 12, 2007, available at http://nwtemc.org/Documents/IMOU-
PHSKC-Tribe.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2015).
174. Id. at I (emphasis in original).
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sharing of surplus staff, pharmaceuticals, and supplies during an emergency to
the extent available.7 5 Consistent with the nonbinding nature of the agreement,
cooperative efforts are framed not as obligatory, but as endeavors that the parties
"may" undertake at their discretion. 76
At the other end of the spectrum is an agreement between the Puyallup Tribe
of Indians and the Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department. 177 The agreement
grants the Department broad jurisdiction over "Tribal Lands, People on Tribal
Lands and Tribe members off Tribal Lands ... for purposes of epidemiological
research, investigation, prevention, containment and treatment related to a
Disease or Contamination Event affecting human health."'17 8 Crucially, the
agreement also spells out many of the corollary details necessary to give effect to
its jurisdictional grant. These include (i) access to tribal lands for county officials
to carry out their investigative and response duties; (ii) a guarantee that the tribe
will give full faith and credit to detention, isolation, and quarantine orders issued
by state courts; (iii) a guarantee of assistance from tribal police in enforcing such
orders; and (iv) use of tribal personnel, facilities, and materials where necessary
to support isolation or quarantine.179 Other provisions safeguard the rights of
tribal members, calling for the county to adhere to state law safeguards in
employing social distancing measures and providing for challenges to those
measures in either tribal or county courts. "0
175. Id. at 1-2.
176. The only item slightly at odds with the otherwise carefully noncommittal nature of the
agreement is a provision requiring that the costs associated with the sharing of staff or materials be
carefully tracked "for reimbursement after the event is over." Id. at 2. Given the disclaimer at the
front of the agreement, it is unlikely that this would be construed to create a binding obligation of
reimbursement.
177. Mutual Aid Agreement, Puyallup Tribe of Indians, Tacoma-Pierce Cnty. Health Dept.,
(Sept. 7, 2005), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdch/ISOLATION-QUARANTINE_-
.Puyallup_- TPCHDPublicHealthMutualAid_201022.7.pdf [hereinafter Puyallup Mutual Aid
Agreement]. A substantially identical agreement appears to have been proposed between the
Lummi Nation and Whatcom County in Washington, but, according to officials from the Whatcom
County Health Department, was never put in place. See Memorandum of Understanding, Lummi
Nation, Whatcom Cnty. Health Dept., 2006, available at
http://nwtemc.org/Documents/Lummi%20Nation%20revised.doc (last visited Apr. 29, 2015);
Email from Marcus Deyerin, Emergency Response Program Specialist, Whatcom County Health
Department to Author (May 14, 2013) (on file with author).
178. Puyallup Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 177, at 2.
179. Id. at 2-3.
180. Id. at 3. The agreements also contain provisions that, among other things, state that the
aid provided for therein is gratuitous; clarify that the parties are legally responsible for their own
actions and omissions; require the maintenance of certain types of insurance policies; require that
medical records be maintained in compliance with state and federal confidentiality laws; and call
for the sharing of disease or contaminant information where necessary to avert harm to personnel
performing services under the agreements. Id. at 3-4.
15:2 (2015)
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The most interesting of the Washington agreements is the one that stakes out
the middle ground, arising from collaborations among a number of tribes and
counties in Washington's Olympic Peninsula. The agreement addresses issues of
public health emergency coordination in the absence of consistent public health
infrastructure among the various governments with jurisdiction in the
Peninsula.'8' With the help of a facilitator from the Washington Department of
Health, three county health departments'82 and seven tribes'83 came together to
draft an agreement that would not only improve public health emergency
preparedness within the region, but also honor the sovereignty of the parties by
providing enough flexibility to fit their varying circumstances. The resulting
agreement, eventually signed by all participating governments, reflects a balance
of those priorities and objectives.
Like the Snoqualmie agreement, the Olympic Regional Mutual Aid
Agreement is premised explicitly on the fact that, while the parties acknowledge
the necessity for collaboration, the agreement does not create a binding legal duty
to provide mutual aid. 184 However, the Olympic Agreement offers a much more
comprehensive set of expectations and procedures for coordination and for
invoking assistance during an emergency. At bottom, the Agreement is a
mechanism through which tribes can temporarily fill gaps in their public health
infrastructure and expertise in order to respond to a public health emergency.
Noting that some of the tribal signatories represent tribes without health officers
or complete health codes, the Agreement lays out two options for tribes to
exercise their public health authority in an emergency.85 First, the tribe may
choose to grant the closest county health department permission to exercise
public health response authority over tribal lands and all inhabitants therein under
the procedures and authority of local, state, federal, and-if there is a tribal
181. See Susan Ferguston et al., The Olympic Regional Tribal-Public Health Collaboration
and Mutual Aid Agreement and Operation Plan: Challenges and Solutions, available at
http://www.npaihb.org/epicenter/emergency-preparednessconference-201 0_presentations (last
visited Apr. 29, 2015) (follow third link from the bottom to Dr. Ferguston's presentation);
Telephone Interview with John Erikson, Special Assistant, Pub. Health Emergency Preparedness &
Response, Wash. Dep't of Health (Apr. 4, 2013).
182. These are the Kitsap County Health District, the Clallam County Health Department, and
the Jefferson County Health Department. See Ferguston et al., supra note 181.
183. These include the Hoh Tribe, Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe, Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe,
Makah Tribe, Port Gamble S'Klallam Tribe, Quileute Tribe, and Suquamish Tribe. Id.
184. See Olympic Regional Tribal-Pub. Health Collaboration & Mutual Aid Agreement 1, 4
(2009), http://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/5l100/Olympic-Regional-Tribal-Public-
Health-Mutual-Aid-Agreement.pdf (last visited April 21, 2015) [hereinafter Olympic Regional
Mutual Aid Agreement].
185. Id. at 5-7.
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health code provision on point-tribal law. 186 Second, the tribe may elect to
retain its public health response authority but rely on the county health
departments for technical assistance.'87 In either case, the tribe and county
governments have the right to decline or rescind a request or offer of assistance at
any time. '88
The Olympic Regional Mutual Aid Agreement thus lays the foundation for
the sort of devolution of public health authority the Puyallup agreement
contemplates. At the same time, the Olympic Regional Mutual Aid Agreement
allows tribes to choose whether to actually transfer authority to the county health
department-and allows the county to choose whether to accept that authority-
on a case-by-case basis. The Agreement goes on to cover various matters
ancillary to the provision of assistance: (i) specifying the chain of command for
staff and resources shared under the agreement; 189 (ii) providing for
reimbursement for the costs of personnel and resources utilized during an
emergency;'90 (iii) requiring proper registration of personnel under the State's
emergency laws (entitling them to certain benefits and protections);'9' and (iv)
disclaiming liability for the acts and omissions of the other party's personnel.'92
To aid coordination and implementation, the Agreement also calls for the parties
to participate in an initial regional exercise and exchange their individual
emergency preparedness plans.193 Lastly, the Agreement sets forth a detailed
dispute resolution process that ranges from informal discussions to mediation
and, if necessary, binding arbitration. Moreover, the dispute resolution process
includes a provision for enforcement of arbitration awards in tribal or federal
court, depending on the party seeking equitable relief. 194
The multiplicity of approaches within the State of Washington alone speaks
to the variety of ways in which tribes and state or local public health officials can
address questions surrounding public health emergency response authorities.
Some tribes may be willing to turn over responsibility for public health
emergencies to another governmental entity. Others may prefer an approach that
186. Id. at 6.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 7. The agreement provides that non-medical personnel and resources are placed
under the command of the requesting party's leadership, while medical personnel remain under the
supervision of the responding party's health officer.
190. Id. at 8.
191. Id.; see also, WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 118-04-080 (2015).
192. Olympic Regional Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 184, at 9.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id. at 10-12. The agreement calls for awards to be enforced against tribes in tribal court,
and against county health departments in federal court (or, if federal jurisdiction is lacking, in
county court). Id. at 11.
15:2 (2015)
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maintains tribal control over emergency response. To be sure, there is no single
model appropriate to every situation.
B. Funding and Single Subject Agreements
Although few of the states researched for this Article had direct public health
emergency IGAs like Washington's, the other four states each had some form of
relevant or analogous agreement in place. Most prevalent among such
agreements were provisions related to funding for tribal public health
preparedness activities. The majority of the states had entered into such IGAs
with at least some of the tribes within state lines. These agreements typically
passed through to the tribes a portion of the state's Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) grant funding in exchange for a specific set of public health preparedness
deliverables. Some of the more common IGA provisions focused narrowly on
tribal readiness deliverables, such as the completion of a public health
preparedness self-assessment tool. 95 Other IGAs encouraged intergovernmental
coordination by requiring tribal participation in regional or state-wide planning
discussions, preparedness exercises, and trainings. 196
Arizona's funding agreements warrant special mention. Arizona forged
agreements with twelve of the twenty-one tribes having a presence in the state,
whereby the state would provide funding (through the CDC Public Health
Emergency Preparedness Cooperative grants) for public health preparedness
work. 19 7 Unique to Arizona's agreements are their comprehensive scope. The
agreements, which cover a five-year term, require the tribes to hire or appoint a
public health preparedness coordinator who becomes responsible for a substantial
roster of deliverables and activities. 98 Each contracting tribe must: (i) develop its
195. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Grant Agreement, N.M. Dept. of Health-Pueblo of Zia, 2013
(deliverables include "[c]onduct a tribal self assessment of Public Health Emergency Preparedness
using the Public Health and Healthcare Capabilities Planning Guide (CPG) prepared by the CDC").
196. See, e.g., id. (requiring tribal emergency coordinator or representative to attend state
emergency preparedness takeholder meetings); Intergovernmental Grant Agreement, N.M. Dep't
of Health-Pueblo, 2013 (requiring "essential tribal personnel" to participate in Cities Readiness
Initiative trainings and drills); Intergovernmental Agreement, Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs.-Hopi
Tribe, 2010 (requiring tribal participation in quarterly meetings of regional public health
preparedness committee); Sample Statement of Work for Healthcare Coalition Agreements
between the Wash. Dep't of Health and tribes (provided by the Washington Dept. of Health by
email to the author on Apr. 19, 2013) (requiring tribal participation in regional coalition meetings
and public health emergency preparedness training and exercises).
197. Telephone Interview with Teresa Ehnert, Bureau Chief, Pub. Health Emergency
Preparedness, Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs. (Apr. 22, 2013); Telephone Interview with Michael
Allison, Native American Liaison, Ariz. Dep't of Health Servs. (Apr. 12, 2013).
198. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Agreement, Ariz. Dept. of Health Servs.-Navajo Nation,
2010, at 12 (on file with author).
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own public health emergency preparedness and response plan and update it on an
annual basis; and (ii) participate in the development of regional preparedness
plans maintained by the county, state, and/or Indian Health Services.199 The
agreements direct tribes to draft plans for dispensing mass prophylaxis and
medical countermeasures to tribal members, develop a tribal volunteer
coordination plan for emergencies, and-to the extent consistent with its
emergency preparedness plan--enter into mutual aid agreements with local
jurisdictions.200 Other deliverables include, but are not limited to: attendance at
regional preparedness meetings; participation in public health emergency and
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) exercises; and participation in various
activities related to disease surveillance and outbreak investigation.2 ' The
Arizona Department of Health Services has contracted with an elder in the Fort
Mojave Tribe to act as liaison on public health emergency preparedness with
other tribal governments. The elder facilitates coordination with the tribes on
these grant activities and related work.202
Several state and local governments have also formed agreements with tribes
to facilitate transfer of SNS203 medical assets to the tribe for distribution to tribal
members.0 4 The agreements generally provide for SNS assets to be delivered in
an emergency to a location specified in the agreement2°5 or chosen by tribal
leaders at the time of delivery,20 6 for dispensation (at no charge)207 solely to tribal
members and employees.205 The tribe provides the location, personnel, and
199. Id. at 12-13.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 13.
202. Telephone Interview with Teresa Ehnert, supra note 197; Telephone Interview with
Michael Allison, supra note 197.
203. The Strategic National Stockpile is a federally administered and maintained stockpile of
pharmaceuticals and medical supplies available for distribution in the event of a public health
emergency. See Office of Pub. Health Preparedness & Response, Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/stockpile.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2015). The federal
government will deliver SNS assets to the states in the event of an emergency, and states are
responsible for planning for distribution to local communities. Id.
204. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, Me. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., Ctr. for
Disease Control & Prevention-Passamaquoddy Tribe at Indian Township, 2012 (on file with
author) [hereinafter Passamaquoddy SNS Agreement]; Agreement to Provide Strategic National
Stockpile Assets, Maricopa Cnty. Dep't of Health, Office of Preparedness & Response-Gila River
Indian Cmty., 2012 (on file with author) [hereinafter Maricopa Cnty. SNS Agreement].
205. See Maricopa Cnty. SNS Agreement, supra note 204, at 1.
206. See Passamaquoddy SNS Agreement, supra note 204, at 1-2.
207. See Maricopa Cnty. SNS Agreement, supra note 204, at 2; Passamaquoddy SNS
Agreement, supra note 204, at 2.
208. See Maricopa Cnty. SNS Agreement, supra note 204, at 1-2; Passamaquoddy SNS
Agreement, supra note 204, at 2-3.
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equipment (e.g., tables, chairs, computers, and copiers) for the distribution. The
tribe also assumes responsibility for distributing product information to recipients
and keeping records of the dispensation.209  The delivering state or county
government must ensure that the tribe can access medical protocols associated
with the pharmaceuticals to be dispensed. The delivering government may also
provide training or technical assistance on dispensation.210 An agreement from
Maricopa County, Arizona addressed security for SNS assets. It specified that
armed personnel may accompany assets to the delivery point, but only if the
weapons are carried by "certified [state] peace officers" under the direction of the
county's Department of Health.21'
Finally, some agreements address the sharing of public health data, which
can be crucial both during a public health emergency and for normal disease
surveillance purposes. In its simplest form, such an agreement between a local
health department and a tribe requires each party to provide notice to the other of
any disease outbreak that may lead to widespread illness.21 2 However, the data-
sharing obligations need not be perfectly symmetrical. For instance, an
agreement between the Gila River Indian Community and the Arizona
Department of Health Services requires the tribe to provide ongoing
communicable disease reports for individuals within the community. In return,
the agreement obligates the Department to disclose on an annual basis a much
broader set of data relating to individuals residing in the Gila River Indian
Community, including birth and death records, hospital discharge database files,
communicable disease surveillance and tracking data, and birth defect and cancer
registry information.21 3
CONCLUSION: KEY ELEMENTS OF A STATE-TRIBAL AGREEMENT ON PUBLIC
HEALTH EMERGENCY RESPONSE
It would behoove policymakers and practitioners to understand the basic
209. See Maricopa Cnty. SNS Agreement, supra note 204, at 2; Passamaquoddy SNS
Agreement, supra note 204, at 2, 4.
210. See Maricopa Cnty. SNS Agreement, supra note 204, at 1-2; Passamaquoddy SNS
Agreement, supra note 204, at 3.
211. See Maricopa Cnty. S.N.S. Agreement, supra note 204, at 2.
212. See, e.g., Mutual Assistance Agreement, Chippewa Cnty. Health Dep't-Sault Tribe
Health Ctr. (date unknown) (on file with author) (providing that "[i]n the event there is an
occurrence of disease that may cause widespread illness .... the part that first is made aware of the
case will report the case to the other entity within 24 hours of becoming aware of the potential
illness and keep the other entity apprised of the ensuing investigation to ensure coordination of
investigation if necessary").
213. Agreement, Gila River Indian Cmty.-Ariz. Dept. Health Servs., Jun. 1, 2000, at 1 (on file
with author).
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provisions that make for an effective, comprehensive public health mutual aid
agreement.1 4 However, certain issues are of particular concern in the context of
tribal public health. Perhaps most important to any agreement between a tribe
and a neighboring government on issues of public health emergency response is
clarity of scope. That is, an IGA should resolve, not exacerbate, the jurisdictional
uncertainty created by federal Indian law precedents. Achieving clarity can be a
simple matter where the scope of the agreement is broad. For example, one such
agreement provides for the transfer of jurisdiction over "Tribal Lands, People on
Tribal Lands and Tribe members off Tribal Lands.215 Where an agreement is
more targeted in effect, however, drafters should take care to consider the factors
that create jurisdictional uncertainty and to address them precisely as possible.
Questions of scope do not have clear-cut answers. First, scope raises the
issue of geography: which lands are covered? The boundaries of a reservation
provide an easy reference point. Nevertheless, tribal lands come in many
different forms and configurations and are often mixed in with non-Indian lands.
When defining the geographic scope of a particular provision, it is imperative
that drafters be as specific as possible in addressing issues such as whether non-
Indian fee land will be covered by the document.21 6 A related question pertains to
applicability: to whom does a particular provision of an agreement apply? Tribal
members only? Non-member Indians on tribal lands? Non-Indians on tribal
lands? Clarity is particularly important with respect to applicability given the
uncertain status of both state and tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians residing
within tribal boundaries.1 7
Drafters should also plainly define the authorities of each involved party,
regardless of whether the agreement contemplates complete transfer of such
authorities, sharing of authorities, or, as in the Olympic Regional Mutual Aid
Agreement discussed above, merely an option to grant the subject authorities at
the party's discretion.21 8 Even in an agreement providing for a plenary grant of
214. For a good overview of standard mutual aid agreement provisions, see Daniel D. Stier &
Melisa L. Thombley, Public Health Mutual Aid Agreements-A Menu of Suggested Provisions,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2007),
http://www.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/Mutual AidProvisions.pdf.
215. Puyallup Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 177, at 2.
216. For example, the Puyallup Mutual Aid Agreement defines the geographic scope to
include "land within the Puyallup Reservation boundary, Puyallup Tribal Trust Lands, Puyallup
Tribal Member Trust Lands, and lands governed by the Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement
Agreement of 1989, 25 U.S.C. § 1773 (2012) and, collectively, as those lands may be added to or
subtracted from, from time to time." Puyallup Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 177, at 1.
217. Again, the Puyallup Mutual Aid Agreement provides a good example, defining its scope
to include "members of the Tribe and Indian and Non-Indian employees, residents, visitors, guests
and other people on Tribal Lands." Id.
218. Olympic Regional Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 184, at 5-7.
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public health investigative and response authorities, the parties should consider
the specific types of actions a public health emergency might require. To that
end, such actions should be individually enumerated to avoid uncertainty or
disputes later on. In an agreement that provides for exercise of less than total
authority, it is critical that drafters specifically define and limit the powers that
each party may exercise. These may include: closure of daycares, schools, and
businesses open to the public, both tribally owned and otherwise; prohibition of
public gatherings; isolation and quarantine; seizure and destruction of property;
medical examination and compulsory vaccination or treatment; and access to
private lands for investigative activities.
It is just as important that drafters consider the types of subsidiary measures
that may become necessary in the exercise of each party's respective authorities.
For example, even if an agreement grants a tribe and state concurrent authority to
order quarantine of tribal members on reservation land, a state official may
encounter practical barriers to exercising the authority if there is no provision for
assistance from tribal police and recourse to tribal courts for enforcement. The
parties negotiating the agreement should make explicit decisions regarding
access to lands by responding officials, the role of the receiving party's law
enforcement officials, and the use of the receiving party's facilities, personnel,
and materials to aid in the response (e.g., using governmental facilities for
distribution of pharmaceuticals).219
Drafting parties should also address the legal mechanisms for exercise of the
authority arising from the agreement. Foremost among these is the source of the
law that will be applied; if the tribe lacks a comprehensive public health code,
this may mean the importation of state law standards to provide authority for a
response. Likewise, an agreement should identify the court or courts that will
have jurisdiction to enforce and hear appeals from emergency orders. Finally, the
drafters should consider how best to ensure that emergency orders are honored
and enforced by both governmental parties. One approach to this is through a
provision simply stating that the parties will give full faith and credit to orders
issued by the other.22° However, a full faith and credit provision would not
necessarily preclude arguments by an individual subject that the issuing
government lacks jurisdiction. For example, a non-Indian residing on reservation
lands might object to a tribal government's order requiring seizure of his
property, even if there is a full-faith-and-credit agreement between tribal and
state governments. Concurrent orders by state and tribal authorities may therefore
be advised in areas of jurisdictional uncertainty. Such an arrangement should be
219. See, e.g., Puyallup Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 177, at 2-3.
220. See, e.g., id. at 2.
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memorialized in an advance agreement. Moreover, parties may wish to prepare
and exchange form orders ahead of time to ensure smooth coordination during an
221emergency.
There are numerous other items that drafters should address that are not
specific to the tribal-state context. These include reimbursement for aid, liability
(and liability protections) for actions taken by personnel in offering aid or
carrying out a response, licensing of emergency responders, maintenance of
insurance policies, sharing of information, coordination of public messaging, and
dispute resolution.222
Forming an agreement between tribal and state governments is not a simple
matter of sitting down at a table and picking appropriate provisions from a menu
of choices. Internal politics, history, cultural differences, and relational barriers
must be taken into account.223 However, the need is plain for cross-border
cooperation between tribes and neighboring governments to respond to public
health threats. The use of table-top exercises and drills may help the parties
assess the sufficiency of a proposed agreement-and test assumptions224 -ahead
of an emergency.22' The process of exploring and memorializing tribal and state
public health authorities, responsibilities, and roles will offer both sides some
amount of clarity and predictability. It may even form the foundation for a
cooperative relationship. This type of good working relationship is vital to
coordinating an effective and practicable emergency response between tribal and
state governments. Given the omnipresent threat of a widespread public health
emergency, tribes and states must look past the challenges and work together to
form IGAs that will safeguard their mutual interest in the public health during an
emergency.
221. Cf Clifford M. Rees et al., Assessing Information and Best Practices for Public Health
Emergency Legal Preparedness, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 42, 44 (2008) (discussing importance of
ready-to-use legal instruments in an emergency).
222. See generally Stier & Thombley, supra note 214, Olympic Regional Mutual Aid
Agreement, supra note 184; Puyallup Mutual Aid Agreement, supra note 177.
223. Several commentators have addressed the factors that may aid-or impede-negotiation
of agreements between tribes and neighboring governments. See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
DESKBOOK, supra note 65, at 414-16; Getches, supra note 44, at 163 n. 113.
224. The 2009 HINI pandemic highlighted some of the ways in which basic assumptions can
differ between tribe and state/federal public health officials. The CDC's protocols for distribution
of antivirals at the time prioritized dispensation to pregnant women, whereas many tribes insisted
that tribal elders take priority, in light of their central and cherished role in tribal communities.
Several state officials recounted that the mismatch of priorities did not become clear until
arrangements were being made for distribution of SNS materials during the pandemic. Telephone
Interview with John Erikson, supra note 181; Telephone Interview with Mary Schmuacher, Chief
of the Bureau of Health Emergency Mgmt., N.M. Dep't of Health (Mar. 8, 2013).
225. See Stier & Goodman, supra note 160, at S63.
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